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WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A CONCLUSION
AND A FACT?
Howard M. Erichson†

In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, building on Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the
Supreme Court instructed district courts to treat a complaint’s conclusions
differently from allegations of fact. Facts, but not conclusions, are assumed
true for purposes of a motion to dismiss. The Court did little to help judges
or lawyers understand this elusive distinction, and, indeed, obscured the
distinction with its language. The Court said it was distinguishing “legal
conclusions” from factual allegations. The application in Twombly and
Iqbal, however, shows that the relevant distinction is not between law and
fact, but rather between different types of factual assertions. This Essay,
written for a symposium on the tenth anniversary of Iqbal, explores the
definitional problem with the conclusion-fact distinction and examines
how district courts have applied the distinction in recent cases.
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INTRODUCTION
Ten years after Ashcroft v. Iqbal,1 its most basic lesson—that courts
must treat a complaint’s conclusions differently from its allegations of
fact—still perplexes me, but I am gradually coming to terms with the
distinction. While Iqbal’s approach remains troubling as a matter of
procedural policy, some of the cases applying Iqbal’s conclusion-fact
distinction fall into buckets where application of the distinction is
relatively straightforward. The more I see how district judges apply the
distinction, the less incoherent it seems, even as I continue to worry that
it denies court access to some plaintiffs with meritorious claims. In this
Essay, I shall attempt to explain the definitional trouble with the
distinction but also the way district judges pump meaning into it in
several categories of cases.
I. THE INSTRUCTION TO DISTINGUISH CONCLUSIONS FROM FACTS
When the Supreme Court decided Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,2
the reaction among many lawyers and civil procedure scholars was
bewilderment.3 The Court held an antitrust complaint insufficient despite
the complaint’s allegation that a group of telecommunications companies
agreed not to compete in each other’s geographic markets. Whether one
agreed or disagreed with the outcome as a matter of policy, the decision
seemed clearly wrong as an interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8 in light of the rule’s language, history, and prior judicial

556 U.S. 662 (2009).
550 U.S. 544 (2007).
3 See Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1305 nn.67–69
(2010) (noting that Twombly “sent shockwaves throughout the legal community—for academics,
practitioners, and judges alike,” and citing sources).
1
2
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treatment. Rule 8’s language said that a complaint must provide a “short
and plain” statement of the claim.4 The rule’s history suggested that the
function of the complaint was to notify the defendant of the claim against
it rather than to establish the truth of the plaintiffs’ allegations.5 Rule 8’s
context emphasized the permissiveness of the standard in contrast to the
heightened pleading standard established by its neighboring rule.6 Courts
routinely declared that, for purposes of a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, the complaint’s allegations are assumed to be true.7 From
every direction, it was difficult to square Twombly with the prior
understanding of Rule 8. When the decision was announced, however, it
seemed arguably limited to a particular type of case. Justice Souter’s
majority opinion in Twombly stated, “[w]e granted certiorari to address
the proper standard for pleading an antitrust conspiracy through
allegations of parallel conduct, and now reverse.”8 The Court’s reasoning,
moreover, focused on the particular problem of expensive discovery in a
complex antitrust class action.9 Thus, notwithstanding the usual principle
that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply transsubstantively,10 some
thought that Twombly’s impact would be limited.11
4 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 84 (2014) (abrogated
2015) (stating that the forms “suffice under these rules and illustrate the simplicity and brevity
that these rules contemplate”); FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11 (2014) (abrogated 2015) (illustrating the
barebones approach to pleading considered sufficient under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).
5 See STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS & RETRENCHMENT: THE
COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION 137–38 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2017).
6 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that fraud and mistake be pleaded “with
particularity.” FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). The Supreme Court and others regularly invoked the maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius in connection with Rule 9(b) to explain that other types of
pleadings need not be pleaded with particularity. See, e.g., Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics
Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993).
7 See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002); Leatherman, 507 U.S. 163;
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
8 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553 (2007) (internal citation omitted).
9 See id. at 558.
10 See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings
in the United States district courts . . . .”).
11 See, e.g., Allan Ides, Bell Atlantic and the Principle of Substantive Sufficiency Under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2): Toward a Structured Approach to Federal Pleading Practice, 243
F.R.D. 604, 635 (2007); see also Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U.
PA. L. REV. 473, 477–79 (2010) (citing arguments that Twombly was limited to antitrust cases or
to complex cases with a likelihood of expensive discovery); Steinman, supra note 3, at 1305–06.
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Two years later, in Iqbal,12 the Supreme Court removed any doubt
about the impact of Twombly. If Twombly was wrong, Iqbal multiplied
the wrong by explicitly making the Twombly interpretation of Rule 8
transsubstantive.13 The sufficiency of every civil complaint in federal
court was to be judged according to the Twombly analysis.
For those who found Twombly mystifying, Iqbal had an apparent
silver lining: Iqbal explained what judges were supposed to do with
Twombly. Not only did Iqbal make Twombly transsubstantive, it spelled
out the steps of the analysis. Whereas Twombly offered little guidance—
the opinion said that complaints must be “plausible,” but it did not
explain what that word meant or how judges should deploy it—the Iqbal
majority turned Twombly into a set of judicial instructions for deciding
motions to dismiss.14
When reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, Iqbal instructed, a
judge must separate conclusions from facts. On a motion to dismiss, a
complaint’s allegations of facts are assumed to be true while its allegations
of conclusions are not entitled to the same assumption. This, according
to Iqbal, is the first lesson of Twombly. As Justice Kennedy explained in
the majority opinion, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.
Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”15 The opinion makes the
point multiple times: “Although for the purposes of a motion to dismiss
we must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we ‘are
not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.’”16 Going into instruction manual mode, the Iqbal opinion
556 U.S. 662 (2009).
Id. at 684 (“Though Twombly determined the sufficiency of a complaint sounding in
antitrust, the decision was based on our interpretation and application of Rule 8. That Rule in
turn governs the pleading standard ‘in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States
district courts.’ Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 1. Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading
standard for ‘all civil actions,’ and it applies to antitrust and discrimination suits alike.”).
14 See Donald J. Kochan, While Effusive, “Conclusory” Is Still Quite Elusive: The Story of a
Word, Iqbal, and a Perplexing Lexical Inquiry of Supreme Importance, 73 U. PITT. L. REV. 215,
240 (2011) (“Twombly hinted at the importance of the meaning of ‘conclusory’ to judicial review
of the sufficiency of pleading, but it was Iqbal that brought it front and center.”).
15 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
16 Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)); see also id. at 678–79
(“Rule 8 . . . does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than
12
13
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says that a “court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by
identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions,
are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can
provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual
allegations.”17
II. IT’S NOT ABOUT LEGAL CONCLUSIONS
The instructions seem clear enough at first glance: separate the
complaint’s legal conclusions from its factual allegations; assume the
factual allegations are true; and ask whether those factual allegations state
a valid legal claim. When one thinks about these instructions in light of
their application in Twombly and Iqbal, however, the apparent clarity
fades. The problem is that the terms legal conclusions and factual
allegations do not match what the Supreme Court did in Twombly and
Iqbal.
Suppose a complaint’s only substantive allegation states that
“Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for violating the Sherman Act.” Every
judge would agree that this is a legal conclusion; if the complaint says
nothing more, it should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Now,
suppose instead that the complaint alleges the existence of an agreement
among the telecommunications companies BellSouth, Qwest, SBC, and
Verizon to refrain from competing in each other’s geographic markets for
Internet and local telephone service.18 The latter is not a legal conclusion;
it is a factual allegation. It may turn out to be true or untrue, provable or
unprovable, but what it asserts is not a matter of law but rather a matter
of fact concerning the existence of an agreement in the real world among
a group of telecommunications companies.
Similarly, suppose a complaint’s only substantive allegation states,
“Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for violating Plaintiff’s rights under the
Equal Protection Clause.” Again, any judge would label this a legal
conclusion, and if the complaint says nothing more, it should be
dismissed. But suppose instead that the complaint alleges the state of
conclusions.”); id. at 678 (“A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)).
17 Id. at 679.
18 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 551 (quoting Amended Complaint ¶ 51, Twombly, 550 U.S 544
(No. 02 CIV. 10220 (GEL)).
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mind of two individuals—John Ashcroft and Robert Mueller—that each
of them acted with the purpose of discriminating on the basis of race,
religion, or national origin.19 The latter is not a legal conclusion; it is a
factual allegation. It concerns a fact with legal consequences, to be sure,
but this does not make it a legal assertion rather than a factual one. The
allegation that Ashcroft and Mueller designed and implemented a policy
with discriminatory intent is an assertion of fact just as much as the
statement, “I drove to the store because I wanted to buy a pair of socks.”
Neither “I drove to the store” (my conduct) nor “because I wanted to buy
a pair of socks” (my state of mind) is an assertion of law. Both are
assertions of fact.
Despite the Supreme Court’s language in Twombly and Iqbal about
“legal conclusions,” neither Twombly nor Iqbal depended upon a
difference between legal and factual assertions. Rather, they relied on a
distinction between factual conclusions (whether the Twombly defendants
agreed not to compete, whether Ashcroft and Mueller intended to
discriminate) and factual supporting allegations (what the
telecommunications companies said and did, what Ashcroft and Mueller
said and did).20 These cases involved distinguishing two types of
allegations—legally operative factual conclusions, on one side, and
supporting facts, on the other—but the relevant line is not a law-fact
distinction. The phrase “legal conclusion,” as used in Twombly and Iqbal,
is distinctly unhelpful and misleading.21
III. KEEPING AN OPEN MIND ABOUT AN ELUSIVE DISTINCTION
Once one sees that the cases involve a conclusion-fact distinction
rather than a law-fact distinction, one may ask whether the distinction
has any meaning at all. I am a proceduralist, not an epistemologist. But

19 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680 (quoting First Amended Complaint & Jury Demand ¶ 96, Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (No. 04 CV 1809 (JG)(JA)).
20 See, e.g., id. at 681 (“To be clear, we do not reject these bald allegations on the ground that
they are unrealistic or nonsensical. . . . It is the conclusory nature of respondent’s allegations,
rather than their extravagantly fanciful nature, that disentitles them to the presumption of
truth.”).
21 See Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 859 (2010) (“The majority in Iqbal is extremely unclear as
to why these allegations were legal conclusions.”).
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even I can understand that, deep down, there is no satisfying difference
between a conclusion and a fact. At some level, everything is inference; all
factual assertions are conclusions. I have struggled with Iqbal because the
distinction struck me as empty from the start. It is hard to discern why
Ashcroft and Mueller’s state of mind and the telecommunications
companies’ agreement are deemed conclusions while other allegations in
the complaints are deemed non-conclusions entitled to an assumption of
truth.
I am not the only one who found the Iqbal distinction perplexing.22
But I have tried to keep an open mind about the distinction for two
reasons. The first reason, simply put, is that the Supreme Court is the
Supreme Court, and I am not. They have the power to say what the law
is, including the meaning of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. I can
criticize, but it is not productive for me to throw up my hands and refuse
to understand what they said.
The second reason I have tried to remain open to Iqbal’s conclusionfact distinction is more substantive. In other endeavors, plenty of
humans, including myself, distinguish between conclusions and the facts
that permit them to reach those conclusions. In a scientific paper, for
example, the author reports the facts—what experiment was conducted
and what happened—as well as the conclusions the author draws from
those facts.23 Even if readers assume the author’s factual recitation is true
(the experimental method and data), they may question whether the
author’s inferences are justified. If, in other endeavors, we routinely draw
distinctions between conclusions and supporting facts, perhaps the task
of doing so with regard to pleadings is not hopeless.24 The distinction

22 See, e.g., id. at 885 (“Iqbal . . . adopts a two-pronged approach with a first prong that makes
little sense.”); Kochan, supra note 14, at 249 (“We are left with none of the Justices really telling
us what ‘conclusory’ means, but each knowing when or if they saw it.”); Alex Reinert, Pleading
as Information-Forcing, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 2 (2012) (“But even more striking is the
confusion that the two cases have created for the advocates and judges who have to grapple with
the new pleading standard.”).
23 My thanks to Benjamin Zipursky for this analogy.
24 Moreover, even under a notice pleading regime, a pleading must do more than assert that
the defendant is liable; the complaint must tell a narrative from which a court can conclude that,
if proved, the story meets the elements of a claim. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)
(requiring that a complaint give the defendant “fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests”).
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concerns factual assertions to be believed only if supported by other
factual assertions.
The academic literature on pleadings has offered a number of ways
to think about applying Iqbal to distinguish between allegations that
warrant an assumption of truth and those that do not. To the extent there
is any unifying theme, it is a general agreement on the elusiveness of the
distinction.
Donald Kochan produced a thorough exploration of the word
“conclusory” as used throughout legal history and as brought to the fore
in Iqbal.25 He concluded that the word lacks a single coherent definition,
and he found it “questionable whether the Iqbal test provides anything
approaching a workable standard.”26 Kochan focused specifically and
lexicographically on the word conclusory rather than more broadly on the
conclusion-fact distinction, but his analysis sheds light on the elusiveness
of the concept of “conclusoriness,” not merely on the word itself. He
analogized the Iqbal standard to Justice Potter Stewart’s notorious
standard for identifying hard-core pornography in the First Amendment
context: “I know it when I see it.”27 Because of the lack of definition in
Iqbal, Kochan predicted uncertainty in its application: “[u]ntil there is
some more concrete and understandable guidance on the first prong of
Iqbal,” Kochan wrote, “the meaning of ‘conclusory’ in that case will
remain quite elusory to all those involved in civil litigation.”28
Others have offered their own spin on Twombly and Iqbal for
analyzing the sufficiency of pleadings. Edward Hartnett’s helpful
formulation explained the cases in terms of stepping back from a
statement of each element of a claim and offering a narrative to support
that element.29 To explain the Iqbal conclusion-fact distinction, Hartnett
invoked commentaries on pleading by Charles Clark, a framer of the
original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Quoting Clark, Harnett wrote,
“[a] conclusory allegation is one that asserts ‘the final and ultimate

See Kochan, supra note 14.
26 Id. at 306.
27 Id. at 219 (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
28 Id. at 222.
29 Hartnett, supra note 11, at 491 (defining “conclusory allegation” and suggesting that
“[s]uch an allegation is not itself assumed to be true, but must be supported by the pleader going
a ‘step further back’ and alleging the basis from which this conclusion follows”).
25
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conclusion which the court is to make in deciding the case for him,’ that
is, one that alleges an element of a claim.”30
Robert Bone similarly explained the Court’s reasoning in terms of
disregarding allegations that are pleaded “at too high a level of
generality.”31 In contrast to Hartnett, Bone deemphasized whether a
pleading tracks the elements of a legal claim, instead focusing on whether
a complaint as a whole offers enough specificity to permit courts to screen
for non-meritorious claims.32 On Bone’s view, the conclusion-fact prong
of the analysis disappears into the plausibility analysis.33Adam Steinman
suggested that Twombly and Iqbal could be reconciled with prior cases
by viewing them as requiring a transactional approach to pleading, or
what he labeled as “plain pleading.”34 The key question going forward,”
according to Steinman, is “to assess whether an allegation may be
disregarded as conclusory under the Iqbal framework. One answer is to
define conclusory in transactional terms: an allegation is conclusory only
when it fails to identify adequately the acts or events that entitle the
plaintiff to relief from the defendant.”35
IV. COMING TO TERMS WITH THE CONCLUSION-FACT DISTINCTION,
BUCKET BY BUCKET
The best hope for understanding Iqbal’s conclusion-fact distinction
is to look at how it is applied by district courts in a variety of recent cases.
What are district judges actually doing with the distinction, ten years after
Iqbal?36

30 Id. (quoting CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 234 (2d ed.
1947)).
31 Bone, supra note 21, at 860–61.
32 See id. at 868.
33 See id. at 869.
34 Steinman, supra note 3, at 1339; see also Adam N. Steinman, The Rise and Fall of
Plausibility Pleading?, 69 VAND. L. REV. 333, 353 (2016) (referring to his pleading approach as
“transactional”).
35 Steinman, supra note 3, at 1298.
36 This Section offers an account of recent district court cases applying the Iqbal conclusionfact distinction. It does not purport to offer a thorough empirical analysis. While not exhaustive,
it should suffice to illustrate several categories of cases in which the conclusion-fact distinction
frames judicial analysis of pleadings.
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A number of cases applying the distinction seem to fall into a few
big buckets. These buckets include cases involving: (a) pleadings that fail
to specify the involvement of particular defendants in multi-defendant
actions; (b) pleadings that fail to specify the basis for alleging the existence
of a custom, practice, or policy; (c) pleadings that fail to specify the basis
for alleging the existence of an agreement or conspiracy; and (d)
pleadings that allege a defendant’s state of mind without alleging
observable facts to support the inference. In some cases, the pleadings fall
into more than one of these buckets, such as civil rights cases involving
complaints that generally allege a practice or policy and generally allege
the involvement of multiple defendants.
A.

Cases Regarding Individual Participation

A set of cases that follow the Iqbal model closely are those that treat
allegations of a supervisor’s participation as mere conclusions that are not
entitled to an assumption of truth. Some of these cases concern the
supervisor’s liability. As occurred in Iqbal, courts have dismissed claims
against supervisors upon concluding that plaintiffs overreached by
naming defendants up the chain of command without sufficient
allegations to specify the basis for liability against the higher-up
defendants. Others of these cases concern groups of defendants—not
necessarily supervisors—without sufficient allegations regarding each
defendant’s individual participation.
For example, in Hyberg v. Enslow,37 an inmate filed a 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 claim against four correctional facility employees, asserting that
they conducted illegal strip searches. One of the defendants, Rittenhouse,
was not alleged to have been present during either of the strip searches
but was alleged to have ordered the searches under illegal conditions.38
After reciting the Iqbal framework,39 the magistrate judge found the
complaint’s allegations insufficient: “[t]hese allegations are too

No. 18-cv-00014-RM-NRN, 2019 WL 979026 (D. Colo. Feb. 28, 2019).
Id. at *2 (noting that the complaint alleged that Rittenhouse “ordered both searches”); id.
at *7 (“According to Mr. Hyberg’s complaint, neither Mr. Rittenhouse nor Mr. Cunningham
personally participated in or were even present during either the January 24 or April 17, 2017
searches.”).
39 Id. at *3.
37
38
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conclusory to plausibly allege Mr. Rittenhouse’s personal participation in
either the January 24 or April 17, 2017 search.”40
Similarly, in Miller v. Luzerne County Department of Corrections,41
an inmate asserted claims against fourteen defendants related to a strip
search. The district court dismissed the claims with respect to five of the
fourteen defendants. Regarding the claims against a particular
correctional officer and trooper, after setting forth the Iqbal framework,42
the court explained, “Mr. Miller fails to make any specific averments with
respect to CO Flynn or Tpr. Kosakevitch’s involvement in the various
events which allegedly led to the violation of his constitutional rights.
Neither defendant is alleged to have known of or participated in the April
2016 strip search.”43 The court granted the plaintiff twenty-one days “to
file an amended complaint alleging the personal involvement of CO
Flynn and Tpr. Kosakevitch and any others he claims were involved” in
the strip search or in acts of retaliation.44
In Korth v. Hoover,45 plaintiff Korth alleged that he was assaulted by
police officer Botts when Korth went to the municipal building to file a
grievance. His complaint asserted claims against the officer’s supervisors,
alleging that the supervisors “condoned, if not encouraged, the unlawful
behavior of Botts leading up to and including the attack upon Mr.
Korth.”46 The complaint alleged that the supervisors provided “either no,
or inadequate, training to Botts pertaining to the outrageous and
egregiously unprofessional misconduct, including sexual harassment and
similar complaints against police officers, including the handling of
citizens like Mr. Korth who made such complaints.”47 The complaint
alleged that the defendants failed “to appropriately hire, train, supervise,
discipline, and investigate Botts,” and that the “individual defendants
assisted each other in performing the various actions described, and lent
their physical presence, support and the authority of their office to each

40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

Id. at *8.
No. 3:18-CV-0858, 2019 WL 1040675 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2019).
Id. at *2–3.
Id. at 12.
Id.
190 F. Supp. 3d 394 (M.D. Pa. 2016).
Id. at 405.
Id.

910

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:899

other during said events.”48 Applying the Twombly-Iqbal conclusion-fact
distinction,49 the court found these allegations insufficient. The district
judge explained, “Plaintiff had to specify what Botts’ previous ‘outrageous
and egregious unprofessional misconduct’ was and describe what the
‘numerous citizen complaints’ were.”50 Regarding the “failure to” claims
(failure to hire, train, supervise, discipline, and investigate), “Plaintiff also
had to allege specific training that should have been provided and the
supervisory practice that was not employed.”51
In non-supervisor cases, as well, allegations of participation by
multiple defendants have been treated as conclusions. In Robb v.
Connecticut Board of Veterinary Medicine,52 a veterinarian asserted an
antitrust claim against the state veterinary board and its five individual
members. The court found the complaint inadequate, and explained its
reasoning both in terms of insufficient allegations of agreement à la
Twombly and in terms of insufficient allegations of participation by each
individual defendant:
Dr. Robb makes only conclusory allegations as to an agreement
among the Individual Defendants, either tacit or express. The
Amended Complaint does not describe any action to that effect
engaged in by any of the Individual Defendants. The pleading
refers to the alleged conspirators by name only once, and then
only to identify the parties to the litigation. By failing to make a
single allegation as to the conduct of the individuals that
allegedly came to an illegal agreement, [plaintiff has failed
adequately to allege an antitrust violation].53
In Lentz v. Taylor,54 the plaintiff alleged that a large number of
defendants “deliberately fabricated, suppressed, and destroyed
exculpatory evidence” and thereby violated her due process rights in
connection with her criminal trial.55 The court, applying the Iqbal

48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

Id.
Id. at 398–99.
Id. at 405.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
157 F. Supp. 3d 130 (D. Conn. 2016).
Id. at 144.
No. 17-4515 (RBK/JS), 2019 WL 1091392 (D.N.J. Mar. 8, 2019).
Id. at 33.
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framework, found the allegations “overly vague and conclusory” because
they lumped defendants together: “[t]his grouping of Defendants erodes
any specific factual allegations against each Defendant. . . . This Court
will not impute generalized allegations onto specific Defendants.”56
The bottom line is that district courts apply Iqbal to require that
pleadings particularize allegations as to individual defendants rather than
lump all defendants together. Even if a plaintiff may have a claim against
someone, these cases make it clear that the plaintiff cannot simply name
anyone as a defendant, even if they are part of a group that has acted
wrongly, and even if they occupy a position of supervisory responsibility.
District courts seem to take Iqbal as an instruction and reaffirmation that
a complaint against multiple defendants must state the basis for liability
against each.
B.

Cases Regarding Custom, Practice, or Policy

Some cases treat allegations of the existence of a custom, practice, or
policy as mere conclusions that are not entitled to an assumption of truth.
In particular, courts have applied Iqbal to throw out claims of “unofficial
policies” where the complaint does not adequately say what the policy is
or offer more than speculation regarding the policy’s existence.
In DeLeon v. City of Vista,57 the complaint alleged that law
enforcement officers used excessive force and asserted a Monell claim58
against the city, county, sheriff, and deputy mayor. The complaint alleged
that these municipal and supervisory defendants should be liable for
“unlawful policies, customs and habits of improper and inadequate
hiring, training, retention, discipline and supervision of its
deputies/patrol officers, proximately causing the constitutional

56 Id. at 34–35 (citing Vaughn v. Geo Grp., No. 18-10148 (JMV) (SCM), 2018 WL 3056066
(D.N.J. June 20, 2018)); see also Martin v. Cty. of Atlantic, No. 18-11931 (RBK/AMD), 2019 WL
1012011, at *5 n.6 (D.N.J. Mar. 4, 2019) (“Plaintiff’s failure to identify which officers, aside from
Perna, engaged in the alleged ‘protective sweep’ by the barn fails to sufficiently allege each party’s
personal involvement in the alleged violation. If Plaintiff decides to amend, she must specify
which Defendants engaged in which allegedly wrongful conduct on this and all other counts pled
as a group.”).
57 No. 18cv714 JM(BGS), 2019 WL 969544 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2019).
58 See Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978) (permitting
§ 1983 civil rights claims to be brought against local governments).
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deprivations.”59 The complaint further alleged that “the City and County,
through its patrol division, has a custom, policy or practice of failing to
properly investigate citizen complaints and failing to take corrective or
disciplinary action against officers who act improperly, thus leading to
constitutional violations against Thomas,” and the complaint added
allegations about several incidents in which deputies were alleged to have
used unnecessary force.60 The district court, relying on Iqbal, found the
allegations inadequate:
[The Second Amended Complaint’s (SAC’s)] allegations fall
short of establishing a Monell claim. The SAC’s reference to
several random incidents allegedly involving County and City
officials using unnecessary force do not establish a cognizable
§ 1983 claim. Of the approximately 15,000 annual contacts
between the citizenry and County and City’s deputies, Plaintiffs
cite only a few incidents of alleged excessive force. Such
allegations do not reasonably establish either a custom, practice,
or policy; and are insufficient to establish a claim for liability
under Monell. Plaintiffs[’] conclusory allegations fail to comply
with the requisite pleading standards. After Iqbal, boilerplate
allegations and ‘threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice’
to state a claim.61
Because the complaint had failed adequately to allege a municipal
custom, practice, or policy, the court dismissed the Monell claim against
the municipal defendants even as the court denied motions to dismiss the
plaintiff’s state law claims.62
In Estate of Binn v. City of Adamsville,63 the complaint alleged that
the defendant city and two supervisors, Cotton and Carter, had an
“unofficial custom” and “unofficial policy” of failing to investigate

59
60
61
62
63

DeLeon, 2019 WL 969544, at *4.
Id.
Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 56 U.S. 662, 662 (2009)).
Id. at *6.
No. 2.17-cv-01993-RDP, 2019 WL 968904 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 28, 2019).
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crimes.64 As to the supervisors, the court found the allegations “wholly
conclusory,”65 explaining:
Plaintiff has alleged no facts showing a specific policy
implemented or enforced by Cotton and Carter. Plaintiff has not
alleged any facts supporting a custom of failing to investigate or
any facts showing a persistent and widespread practice of failing
to investigate. In fact, Plaintiff has alleged no facts regarding any
other investigation.66
As to the municipality, the court similarly found the complaint’s
allegation of an “unofficial custom” and “unofficial policy” unavailing:
Plaintiff has not alleged with proper specificity a custom or
practice by Adamsville allowing such behavior. For example,
Plaintiff has not alleged that any similar incidents occurred that
would have placed Adamsville on notice of the need for
additional training and supervision. Similarly, Plaintiff has not
made any other factual allegations which would explain why
additional training or supervision was obviously necessary.67
Finding the allegations “conclusory and devoid of factual content,”
the court dismissed the claim against the municipality.68
In Whitener v. Parker,69 a prisoner pro se plaintiff alleged that the
defendants failed to provide him adequate medical care. The district
judge explained why the complaint must be dismissed:
Plaintiff avers that unspecified Defendants essentially gave him
the runaround and ignored his need for surgery “in order to save
cost.” But Whitener provides only conclusions that [Tennessee
Department of Corrections] policies were in play to prevent his
medical care. He does not set forth any factual allegations to
support his claim that the policies were the moving force behind
the alleged deficiencies in his medical treatment.70

64
65
66
67
68
69
70

Id. at *8.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *9.
Id.
No. 1:17-cv-01241-JDB-egb, 2019 WL 1030544 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 4, 2019).
Id. at *3.
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Citing the Iqbal principle that conclusions “are not entitled to the
assumption of truth” and “must be supported by factual allegations,”71 the
judge dismissed the complaint but granted leave to amend.72
In Korth, discussed above in connection with supervisory liability,
the court found that the complaint failed to specify the policy or custom
that allegedly caused the assault on the plaintiff by a police officer:73 “[w]e
disagree with Plaintiff that he has clearly specified the policies and
customs that caused him harm. As noted above, Plaintiff must plead
sufficient facts to make his claim plausible, and we cannot accept
allegations that are mere conclusions,” the court explained. “As set forth
above, Plaintiff’s allegations bearing on policy and custom are totally
conclusional.”74
C.

Cases Regarding Agreement or Conspiracy

Some cases, closely following the Twombly model, treat allegations
of agreement or conspiracy as mere conclusions that are not entitled to
an assumption of truth.
In Robb, the court not only found the allegations insufficient as to
each of the individual defendants,75 it also, relatedly, found the allegation
of agreement unsatisfactory: “to satisfy the pleading requirement at the
Rule 12(b)(6) stage, an antitrust plaintiff may not simply allege that ‘the
parties agreed.’ . . . [A]ny conclusory allegation of an ‘agreement’ is not to
be accepted as true; the plaintiff must allege facts affirmatively

Id. at *2 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 56 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)).
Id. at *4.
73 See supra text accompanying notes 45–51.
74 Korth v. Hoover, 190 F. Supp. 3d 394, 405 (M.D. Pa. 2016); see also Najera v. Green, No.
CV 18-07116 FMO (AFM), 2019 WL 1059684, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2019) (finding that the
complaint, which alleged that the mayor of Los Angeles failed to enforce rules and regulations,
was insufficient because it “fails to set forth any factual allegations that a specific policy or custom
promulgated by the City of Los Angeles was the ‘actionable cause’ of a specific constitutional
violation,” and because it did not state “what specific rules or regulations were not enforced,
when the rule or regulation was not enforced, how non-enforcement impacted plaintiff, and what
constitutional violation resulted”).
75 Robb v. Conn. Bd. of Veterinary Med., 157 F. Supp. 3d 130, 147 (D. Conn. 2016); see supra
text accompanying notes 52–53.
71
72
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demonstrating such an agreement.”76 The court went on to suggest what
sort of allegations might have sufficed:
By failing to make a single allegation as to the conduct of the
individuals that allegedly came to an illegal agreement, nor as to
the form, dates, place, structure, or detail of such an agreement,
Dr. Robb faces a significant hurdle, as a matter of law, to support
his claim of an antitrust conspiracy. To establish the factual
underpinning of an actual “agreement,” a party must allege facts
that in some way describe the process of that agreement’s
formation.77
Similarly, in Kerwin v. Parx Casino,78 the court dismissed the
plaintiff’s Sherman Act claim because the complaint failed to provide
supporting facts for its allegation of agreement:
Plaintiff alleges an agreement to boycott Plaintiff and his MMA
events only in the most conclusory of terms. For example, the
sole allegation in the Amended Complaint of an alleged
conspiracy states: “[a]ll of the Pennsylvania Casinos, acting in
concert with one another are now boycotting plaintiff from
being able to promote his mixed martial arts events at all of their
casinos . . . .”79
In the absence of supporting factual allegations, the court ruled, such
an allegation of conspiracy is not entitled to the assumption of truth.80
In a very different factual context, the Binn81 court similarly found a
non-specific allegation of conspiracy inadequate: “Plaintiff alleges
Defendants concerted and conspired ‘by failing to conduct a proper
investigation.’ There are no allegations regarding communications
between Defendants, underlying agreements reached, or specific action
in concert. Simply put, such conclusory allegations, with no factual
support, are insufficient to state a claim.”82
Robb, 157 F. Supp. at 143.
Id. at 144.
78 No. 17-CV-5582, 2019 WL 1098949 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 8, 2019).
79 Id. at *5.
80 Id.
81 See supra text accompanying notes 63–68.
82 Estate of Binn v. City of Adamsville, No.: 2:17-cv-01993-RDP, 2019 WL 968904, at *10
(N.D. Ala. Feb. 28, 2019) (citation omitted).
76
77
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In Pagliaroli v. Ahsan,83 a prisoner sued numerous defendants on
claims related to the denial of medical care for his neck and back
problems. Among other things, the complaint asserted that eight named
defendants as well as John Doe defendants conspired to deny him proper
medical care. The court found the complaint “devoid of any facts to
suggest a conspiracy amongst the Defendants. Instead, Plaintiff merely
states these individuals conspired in a conclusory manner, which is
insufficient to state a claim for conspiracy.”84
In the context of a plaintiff’s allegation of conspiracy to establish
state action for a § 1983 claim, the court in Lentz85 explained the
complaint’s insufficiency with regard to one of the defendants:
Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that [Defendant DFDR
Consulting] engaged in a conspiracy. Most obviously, the
Amended Complaint offers but a series of vague conclusions.
For example, in her claim of a conspiracy between DFDR and
the Cape May County Prosecutor, Plaintiff provides no specific
factual allegations against DFDR. Instead, DFDR is lumped
under the amorphous umbrella of “Defendants,” who “act[ed]
in concert and conspiracy.”86
The court concluded that the complaint offered “merely a
conclusory allegation of agreement at some unspecified point, which does
not supply adequate facts to show illegality.”87 As to another set of
defendants, the court similarly found the allegation of conspiracy to be
conclusory, noting that the defendants were “impermissibly lumped
together” and “Plaintiff alleges no facts to support any meeting of the
minds.”88

No. 18-9683 (BRM), 2019 WL 979244 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2019).
Id. at *5.
85 Lentz v. Taylor, No. 17-4515 (RBK/JS), 2019 WL 1091392 (D.N.J. Mar. 8, 2019).
86 Id. at *5.
87 Id. (quoting Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 179 (3d
Cir. 2010) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007))).
88 Id. at *7.
83
84

2020]

CONCLUSION AND A FACT
D.

917

Cases Regarding State of Mind

In many cases, judges treat state-of-mind allegations as conclusions
that are not entitled to an assumption of truth. Some of these cases
resemble Iqbal in that they involve various forms of discriminatory
intent. Other cases involve other states of mind, such as deliberate
indifference and bad faith. That state-of-mind allegations are a leading
application of Twombly and Iqbal is ironic, as others have noted,89 in light
of Rule 9(b)’s explicit instruction that “[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and
other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.”90 But
perhaps it is unsurprising, inasmuch as the application to state-of-mind
allegations hews close to Iqbal itself.
In Guy v. City of Wilmington,91 the court refused to accord the
assumption of truth to the complaint’s allegation that the defendant had
intentionally divided funds unequally:
Even accepting arguendo, that Guy was treated differently than
others similarly situated, he has further failed to state a plausible
claim that Defendant’s separate treatment of him was
intentional. Plaintiff’s equal protection claim simply states
“[t]he discretionary funds were intentionally divided
unequally.” As stated in Iqbal, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels
and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.’” The Amended Complaint’s
allegation of intentional discrimination is purely conclusory and
insufficient to support a class of one theory for an equal
protection clause violation.92
In Carson v. Wetzel,93 the complaint alleged that prison medical
personnel “deliberately treated Plaintiff differently because of his mental
instability, race and weight,”94 and the court found this “conclusory
averment” insufficient to state a claim.95 The court explained that

89
90
91
92
93
94
95

See, e.g., Reinert, supra note 22, at 7 n.43.
FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
No. 17-576 (MN), 2019 WL 973579 (D. Del. Feb. 28, 2019).
Id. at *4 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 56 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
No. 17-73 Erie, 2019 WL 972102 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2019).
Id. at *3.
Id.
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“Plaintiff has not pleaded any facts to support this averment; indeed, he
has failed to even articulate his race, weight, or the name or nature of the
mental impairment that he allegedly suffers from.”96
Some cases apply Iqbal’s conclusion-fact distinction to allegations of
“deliberate indifference,” holding that the conclusion of deliberate
indifference must be backed up by supporting allegations of facts. In
Pagliaroli,97 for example, a prisoner alleged that the defendants were
deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. The court treated the
allegation of deliberate indifference as a conclusion, not entitled to the
assumption of truth:
Plaintiff’s Complaint relies on formulaic language and does not
provide sufficient facts describing the policy or procedure in
effect at the time of the alleged injury or how that policy or
procedure caused his constitutional injury. He generally refers
to cost-saving measures, understaffing and substandard medical
personnel, but with no specific facts. Nor has he provided facts
to suggest Defendant Johnson was deliberately indifferent to the
risk presented by the policy in effect at the time of his alleged
injury; instead, again, he merely states in a conclusory manner
that Defendant Johnson was deliberately indifferent.98

Id.
Pagliaroli v. Ahsan, No. 18-9683 (BRM), 2019 WL 979244 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2019); see supra
text accompanying notes 83–84.
98 Pagliaroli, 2019 WL 979244, at *4. Similarly, in Williams v. Ellerbe, 317 F. Supp. 3d 144
(D.D.C. 2018), a case involving an Eighth Amendment claim by an inmate allegedly beaten by
officers, the court treated the complaint’s allegation of “deliberate indifference” by the District of
Columbia as a mere conclusion:
96
97

To begin, the Court may not credit legal conclusions that are not supported by factual
allegations. The allegations of fact raised in the amended complaint, however, establish
only that the District had knowledge after the fact that two of its employees beat
Williams. Those allegations do not address what the District knew or should have
known before the alleged attack, and they do not support a claim that the District’s
deliberate indifference caused or failed to prevent the incident.
Id. at 149 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). And in Erdreich v. City of Philadelphia,
No. 18-2290, 2019 WL 1060051 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2019), the court declined to accept as true the
complaint’s general allegations that the city was “deliberately indifferent and reckless with respect
to Mr. Erdreich’s need for medical attention.” Id. at *3. Further,
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Other cases use the Iqbal conclusion-fact distinction to reject
allegations of various other states of mind, including retaliatory intent,99
intentional distortion,100 and bad faith.101
What these cases have in common is that, notwithstanding Rule
9(b), these district judges seem to consider it too easy for plaintiffs to
allege what is in someone else’s head. These judges therefore use Iqbal to
require that a complaint do more than recite the formulaic words
(discriminatory intent, deliberate indifference, bad faith); the complaint
must recite observable facts to support the inference.102
CONCLUSION (IF I MAY SAY SO)
District judges use Iqbal’s conclusion-fact distinction to disregard
plaintiffs’ allegations in a variety of situations where a particular element
of a civil claim is easy to allege in general terms even if it may not be
supportable. Recurrent scenarios involve allegations of conspiracy,
discriminatory intent, deliberate indifference, participation of an entire
group of individuals, and existence of an unofficial policy. What comes
through in these cases is skepticism on the part of the district court judges
about whether the plaintiffs have facts to back up their general allegations.
In this way, a kind of plausibility analysis infuses the first step of the Iqbal
test. That is, district judges disregard allegations where, because of the
the allegations advanced by Plaintiff in this case simply paraphrase the legal standard
for a deliberate indifference claim. While a court at the motion to dismiss stage is
required to accept as true all of the allegations in the complaint, it “need not credit a
complaint’s ‘bald assertions’ or ‘legal conclusions’ when deciding a motion to dismiss.”
Id. at *9 (citing Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). The court
noted that Erdreich failed to allege any facts to establish that the commissioner was on notice of
any problem in training or supervision that caused his injuries. Id. at *10; see also Korth v.
Hoover, 190 F. Supp. 3d 394, 405 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (treating complaint’s many allegations of
“deliberate indifference” as conclusions not entitled to assumption of truth).
99 See Hyberg v. Enslow, No. 18-cv-00014-RM-NRN, 2019 WL 979026, at *10 (D. Colo. Feb.
28, 2019) (“Mr. Hyberg’s allegations concerning Mr. Quinn’s anger over the cost of rebuilding
the strip out area are conclusory and devoid of ‘sufficient factual matter . . . .”).
100 See Estate of Binn v. City of Adamsville, No.: 2:17-cv-01993-RDP, 2019 WL 968904 (N.D.
Ala. Feb. 28, 2019).
101 See Sgrillo v. Geico Casualty Co., 323 F. Supp. 3d 1167 (D. Nev. 2018).
102 Again, this application of Iqbal is jarring in light of Rule 9(b)’s provision that states of mind
may be averred generally, but it is nonetheless an application that hews close to the Iqbal decision
itself.
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nature of the allegation and the level of generality at which the allegation
is made,103 the judge questions whether the plaintiff has any factual basis
to satisfy an element of a claim.
Twombly and Iqbal, as a matter of procedural policy, pit the value of
court access against the value of weeding out potentially non-meritorious
claims. While both of these functions have value, other devices such as
summary judgment can carry much of the weight on the latter function,
and my own view is that Twombly and Iqbal have made it too easy for
judges to throw out claims before plaintiffs have obtained discovery and
before defendants have had to admit or deny plaintiffs’ allegations.104 But
if one takes the Supreme Court’s policy choice as a given, one can ask
another question: whether the Court’s chosen mechanism—a distinction
between conclusions and other factual allegations—can be applied
coherently. My skepticism on this front has given way to grudging
acknowledgement that, at least in several large categories of cases, judges
can draw the distinction.
The first step to understanding the distinction is to disregard the
Supreme Court’s misleading language about “legal conclusions.” Looking
at what the Court actually did in Twombly and Iqbal shows that the
conclusion-fact distinction does not ask judges to distinguish between
law and fact, but rather to identify assertions that are to be believed, for
purposes of a motion to dismiss, only if supported by other assertions.
The next step is to consider the types of cases in which the distinction is
regularly applied. Examination of recent cases shows that there are
buckets of cases in which district judges distinguish allegations of
conclusions from allegations of supporting facts in a reasonably
straightforward manner.
Perhaps it is damning with faint praise to say of a Supreme Court
case that its central lesson, while troubling as a matter of access to justice,
is not completely incoherent. But that captures where this proceduralist
finds himself on Iqbal, ten years later.

103 See Bone, supra note 21, at 859–60. The way plausibility analysis informs the conclusionfact distinction matches Bone’s explanation of Iqbal. See supra text accompanying notes 31–33.
104 For an early and powerful articulation of this view, see A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility
Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431 (2008).

